Battle of Caving Banks

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The Battle of Poison Spring was fought in Ouachita County, Arkansas on April 18, 1864, as part of the Camden Expedition, during the American Civil War. A Union force commanded by Major General Frederick Steele had moved from Little Rock, Arkansas towards Shreveport, Louisiana in support of Major-General Nathaniel Banks' move up the Red River towards Shreveport. After Banks was defeated at the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, Steele was isolated in Arkansas. Short on supplies, Steele sent a detachment commanded by Colonel James M. Williams to search for supplies. Williams' column was attacked by Confederate troops under the command of Brigadiers General John S. Marmaduke and Samuel B. Maxey. After a sharp fight, Williams' command was routed, losing its wagon train and four cannons. The defeat at Poison Spring and another defeat at the Battle of Marks' Mills a week later led Steele to retreat to Little Rock. The battle is infamous for the Confederates' slaughter and mutilation of African-American Union soldiers of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry. Poison Springs Battleground State Park, which is part of the Camden Expedition Sites National Historic Landmark, preserves a portion of the site of the battle.

Background

By early 1864, the Confederacy's likelihood of winning the American Civil War against the Union was slimming. The Confederate situation in Arkansas was particularly bad. Union forces had captured the state capital of Little Rock,[1] and had at least nominal control over all of the state north of the Arkansas River. The Confederate political and military authorities had fallen back into the southwestern portion of the state.[2] In March, the Union Navy and Union Army began a joint operation up the Red River, known as the Red River campaign. Militarily, the campaign targeted Shreveport, Louisiana, and the dispersal of Confederate forces in that region of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. Additionally, the campaign also had political goals (the establishment of a pro-Union government in Louisiana) and economic goals (the capture of Confederate cotton). Major General Nathaniel P. Banks led the army forces, with Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter in charge of the naval operations.[3]

To support this movement, Union troops commanded by Major General Frederick Steele were tasked with moving south from Little Rock to Shreveport, in what became known as the Camden Expedition. Steele objected to his portion of the campaign due to the poor state of the road network of the region his men would have to march through, as well as the lack of food in the region. He was also worried about guerrilla warfare and his supply line. The Camden Expedition involved two Union forces beginning the campaign independently and joining during the march: Steele started from Little Rock, while Brigadier General John M. Thayer left Fort Smith, Arkansas.[4][a] The Confederate troops opposing the Camden Expedition were led by Major General Sterling Price. Price's infantry had been transferred to Louisiana to face Banks's advance,[9] leaving him with only 3,200 cavalrymen.[9][10]

Steele left Little Rock on March 23, and reached Arkadelphia on March 29. He was supposed to join forces with Thayer there, but Thayer's column was delayed and Steele continued forward on April 1. After learning that Camden was fortified, Steele decided to feint towards Washington (the new Confederate state capital) in order to draw the Confederates out of Camden, allowing the latter place to be taken easily.[7] Due to lack of supplies, the Union troops had to subsist on half rations,[11] and drinkable water was scarce in areas due to guerrillas polluting wells with dead animals.[12] Price's cavalry harassed Steele's advance. The Confederate commander fell for the feint, and moved his troops from Camden to the Prairie D'Ane area. There, he was reinforced by two more cavalry brigades - one of Texas troops and the other of Choctaws. On April 9, Thayer's column joined Steele's; skirmishing between the two sides occurred over the next few days in the Battle of Prairie D'Ane. The combined Union force started towards Camden on April 12, reaching the town three days later.[13]

Prelude

On April 8, Banks was defeated in the Battle of Mansfield. After further fighting at the Battle of Pleasant Hill the next day, Banks decided to break off his offensive and withdraw.[14] At Camden, Steele had significant supply issues with a lack of food for both his men and pack animals. While he did not have official news of Banks's defeat, rumor had reached Camden of the Union defeat, complicating matters for Steele.[15] Union rations had to be reduced to one quarter of the normal amount due to lack of food.[16] Price's cavalry hovered around Camden, unwilling to directly attack due to the disparity in numberical strength but lying in wait of any patrols or forgaing parties sent from the Union command.[12] A large amount of corn was stored on farms in the area surrounding Camden. While Confederates soldiers searched for and destroyed some of this corn, some of it made it into Union hands through foraging and Union-sympathizing civilians; 3,000 bushels were also captured when Union cavalry took the Confederate steamer Homer. All but one of the steam-powered gristmills in the area had been destroyed; Stelle sent part of the 36th Iowa Infantry Regiment to operate it on April 17.[17]

On April 16, Steele learned that 5,000 bushels of corn were located about 15 miles (24 km) from Camden, on the road to Washington. Steele tasked his quartermaster, Captain Charles A. Henry with capturing the cache.[18] Command of the forgaing expedition went to Colonel James M. Williams, the commander of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment.[16] The 1st Kansas Colored was a unit of African American soldiers,[19] many of whom were former slaves.[20] Most Confederates hated the use of African American troops, viewing it as a form of servile insurrection.[21] Additionally, most Confederates did not view the African American troops as parties to the rules of war. Confederate Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith, the commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, had earlier stated that his offices should give "no quarter to armed negroes and their officers". Additionally, the Confederates had a special dislike for Kansas troops in general, as the soldiers from that state had a reputation for excessive pillaging and destruction.[22]

Early on the morning of April 17, Williams set out from Camden with 198 wagons. The wagon escort included 438 from the 1st Kansas Colored,[20] as well as 195 cavalrymen taken from the 2nd Kansas Cavalry Regiment, 6th Kansas Cavalry Regiment, and 14th Kansas Cavalry Regiment, along with two 6-pounder James rifles from the 2nd Independent Battery Indiana Light Artillery. After an 18-mile (29 km) march, the Union troops reached the White Oak Creek area.[23] About half of the corn had already been destroyed by the Confederates when the Union soliders arrived.[24] The corn was scattered in small amounts at various farms in the area, necessitating wide patrols by Williams's command. In addition to the corn, clothing and other belongs were looted from civilian residences in the area. On April 18, the Union column began its return to Camden.[25] That morning, 4 miles (6.4 km) east of White Oak Creek, Williams's men were joined by a relief column sent by Thayer. This consisted of 386 men from the 18th Iowa Infantry Regiment, 95 cavalrymen from the same units that Williams cavalry contingent was drawn from, and two 12-pounder mountain howitzers manned by men of the 6th Kansas Cavalry. In total, the Union force now number 1,169 men, although many were straggling to engage in looting.[26]

Battle

Williams' command consisted of the 1st Kansas Infantry (Colored), the 18th Iowa Infantry, four cannons, and elements of several cavalry regiments. The Confederates learned of the supply train and sent a force composed of Marmaduke's cavalry and a brigade commanded by Brigadier General William L. Cabell. This force was later augmented by Maxey's Confederate division, giving the Confederates a total strength of about 3,500 available men. Marmaduke had been in command of the force, but as Maxey had seniority over Marmaduke, Maxey took overall command.[27] The Confederate plan of battle was to block the path of the wagon train with Marmaduke and Cabell's troops, and then Maxey's division would take the halted train in the flank. As planned, Williams' Union force was blocked by Marmaduke and Cabell on April 18, and Maxey's division, composed of a brigade of Texans under Colonel Charles DeMorse and Walker's Native Americans, hit the flank of Williams' column. However, Maxey's initial assault was repulsed by the 1st Kansas (Colored). The next Confederate charge was more coordinated, with Marmaduke and Maxey attacking the Union force simultaneously.[28]

After a fight of about an hour, Maxey's men were again forced to retreat, but the Union soldiers began to run low on ammunition. A third Confederate charge broke the flank of the Union position, and the 1st Kansas (Colored) abandoned its position. The 18th Iowa attempted to form a second line but was quickly driven off by the Confederate assault.[29] The African-American soldiers of the 1st Kansas (Colored) were "showed [..] no quarter".[30] Many of the members of the Kansas regiment who fell into Confederate hands were killed and mutilated; some observers reported that Walker's Choctaws took scalps from dead Union soldiers.[31] Walker would later write:

...the train fell into our hands, and soon a portion of his artillery, which my troops found concealed in a thicket near the train. I feared here that the train and its contents would prove a temptation too strong for these hungry, half-clothed Choctaws, but had no trouble in pressing them forward, for there was that in front and to the left more inviting to them than food or clothing—the blood of their despised enemy. They had met and routed the forces of General Thayer, the ravagers of their country, the despoilers of their homes, and the murderers of their women and children.[32]

Williams' Union column lost 301 men. The 1st Kansas (Colored) lost 182 men out of 438 men who had participated in the battle. 117 of the 182 losses in the Kansas regiment were killed, which was an unusually high killed-to-wounded ratio. In comparison, the Confederates lost 114 men. The Confederates also captured four cannons and 175 wagons. Within the wagons were 5,000 bushels of corn and non-military items such as furniture and civilian clothing.[33]

Aftermath and preservation

A week later, on April 25, another Union wagon train was captured at the Battle of Marks' Mills. With his forces' lack of supplies, especially food, becoming increasingly problematic, Steele decided to give up on his campaign and withdraw from Camden. Some Confederate forces that had been shifted south to fight Banks were returned to Arkansas. The now-strengthened Confederate force pursued Steele and caught up with the Union soldiers while they were trying to cross the Saline River. On April 30, the Confederates attacked Steele's position near the river in the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry. Steele's forces repulsed the Confederate attacks, allowing the Union soldiers to cross the river. Steele's retreat ended on May 2 when the Union forces reached Little Rock.[34] Steele's force is estimated to have traveled around 275 miles throughout the entire campaign.[35]

The site of the battlefield is preserved within Poison Springs Battleground State Park, which is part of the Camden Expedition Sites National Historic Landmark.[36] The state park is located 12 miles (19 km) from Camden, Arkansas and includes 84 acres of the battlefield.[37] The Camden Expedition Sites National Historic Landmark, which includes the Poison Spring battleground as well as other sites related to Steele's campaign, was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1994.[38]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ The historian Thomas DeBlack lists Steele's stregth as 8,500 men and Thayer's as 4,000.[5] The historian Ludwell H. Johnson puts Thayer's strength at 3,600 men and Steele's at 6,800.[6] Another estimate of Union strength comes from the historian Daniel E. Sutherland, who has Steele's strength as 8,500 and Thayer's as 3,600.[7] The historian Michael J. Forsyth states that Thayer and Steele combined for about 12,000 men.[8]

References

  1. ^ DeBlack 2003a, pp. 11–12.
  2. ^ Christ 2010, pp. 243–244.
  3. ^ Johnson 1998, p. 265.
  4. ^ DeBlack 2003a, pp. 14–15.
  5. ^ DeBlack 2003a, p. 15.
  6. ^ Johnson 1993, p. 171.
  7. ^ a b Sutherland 1994, pp. 110–111.
  8. ^ Forsyth 2003, p. 74.
  9. ^ a b DeBlack 2003a, p. 16.
  10. ^ Sutherland 1994, p. 111.
  11. ^ Urwin 2003, p. 109.
  12. ^ a b DeBlack 2003a, p. 20.
  13. ^ DeBlack 2003b, pp. 109–111.
  14. ^ Forsyth 2003, p. 101.
  15. ^ Forsyth 2003, pp. 103, 106.
  16. ^ a b Urwin 2000, p. 214.
  17. ^ Bearss 1967, pp. 1–2.
  18. ^ Bearss 1967, pp. 2–4.
  19. ^ Sutherland 1994, pp. 114–115.
  20. ^ a b DeBlack 2003b, p. 112.
  21. ^ Moneyhon 2003, p. 49.
  22. ^ DeBlack 2003b, p. 113.
  23. ^ Bearss 1967, p. 6.
  24. ^ Urwin 2003, p. 110.
  25. ^ Bearss 1967, pp. 6–7.
  26. ^ Urwin 2003, p. 111.
  27. ^ Forsyth 2003, pp. 108–111.
  28. ^ Forsyth 2003, pp. 112–115.
  29. ^ Forsyth 2003, pp. 115–116.
  30. ^ Castel 1968, p. 177.
  31. ^ Forsyth 2003, p. 116.
  32. ^ War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 34, part 1, page 849.[1]
  33. ^ Forsyth 2003, pp. 116–117.
  34. ^ Kennedy 1998, pp. 274–275.
  35. ^ "Prairie D'Ane Battlefield". depotmuseum.org. Nevada County Depot & Museum. Retrieved April 12, 2020.
  36. ^ "Poison Springs Battleground State Park". Arkansas State Parks. Retrieved April 9, 2020.
  37. ^ Kennedy 1998, p. 274.
  38. ^ "Camden Expedition Sites National Historic Landmark". National Park Service. Retrieved April 9, 2020.

Sources

  • Bearss, Edwin C. (1967). Steele's Retreat from Camden and the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry. Little Rock, Arkansas: Pioneer Press.
  • Castel, Albert (1968). General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 0-8071-1854-0.
  • Christ, Mark K. (2010). Civil War Arkansas 1863: The Battle for a State. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0-8061-4433-7.
  • DeBlack, Thomas A. (2003a). "An Overview of the Camden Expedition". In Christ, Mark K. (ed.). "All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell": The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring. Little Rock, Arkansas: August House Publishers. pp. 11–30. ISBN 0-87483-736-7.
  • DeBlack, Thomas A. (2003b). With Fire and Sword: Arkansas, 1861–1874. Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas Press. ISBN 1-55728-740-6.
  • Forsyth, Michael J. (2003). The Camden Expedition of 1864. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc. ISBN 0-7864-1554-1.
  • Johnson, Ludwell H. (1993) [1958]. Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. ISBN 0-87338-486-5.
  • Johnson, Ludwell H. (1998). "Military Strategy, Politics, and Economics: The Red River Campaign". In Kennedy, Frances H. (ed.). The Civil War Battlefield Guide (2nd ed.). Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin. pp. 265–266. ISBN 978-0-395-74012-5.
  • Kennedy, Frances H. (1998). The Civil War Battlefield Guide (2nd ed.). New York/Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 978-0-395-74012-5.
  • Moneyhon, Carl H. (2003). "White Society and African-American Soldiers". In Christ, Mark K. (ed.). "All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell": The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring. Little Rock, Arkansas: August House Publishers. pp. 31–57. ISBN 0-87483-736-7.
  • Sutherland, Daniel E. (1994). "1864: "A Strange, Wild Time"". In Christ, Mark K. (ed.). Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in Arkansas. Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas Press. pp. 105–144. ISBN 1-55728-356-7.
  • Urwin, Gregory J. W. (2000). ""We Cannot Treat Negroes ... as Prisoners of War": Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas". In Bailey, Anne J.; Sutherland, Daniel E. (eds.). Civil War Arkansas: Beyond Battles and Leaders. Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas. pp. 47–84. ISBN 1-55728-565-9.
  • Urwin, Gregory J. W. (2003). "Poison Spring and Jenkins' Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition". In Christ, Mark K. (ed.). "All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell": The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring. Little Rock, Arkansas: August House Publishers. pp. 107–137. ISBN 0-87483-736-7.

Further reading

External links